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The Great Powers Have Their Ways 
Sven Biscop 
 
How will the great powers behave? That 
is what determines the future world order 
– or the absence of order. Could it be 
that China and the EU have found an 
alternative for the old-fashioned grand 
strategies that Russia and the US are 
again pursuing? 
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Cooperation and competition have always co-
existed. Great powers simultaneously compete 
on one issue and cooperate on another, in 
varying constellations. They compartmentalise 
their relations with each other: even a very 
serious dispute in one area need not block 
dialogue and cooperation in others. That is 
one way of preventing a deadlock in world 
politics and an escalation of crises that might 
lead to war. But even so, the question what 
will be the basic orientation of each of the 
great powers remains crucial.  
 
RUSSIA: STUCK IN HISTORY  
The main objective of current Russian grand 
strategy is the establishment of a sphere of 
influence in its near abroad. That excludes 
power sharing, for a sphere of influence 
implies exclusivity: Russia wants to be the only 
external power with the right to interfere. To 
achieve that objective, Russia doesn’t hesitate 
to use military force, as witnessed in the 
invasion of the Crimea and the fomenting of 
armed rebellion in eastern Ukraine. This crude 
unilateral exercise of power is the classic way 
of the great powers.  
 
It’s also a decidedly old-fashioned way, which 
no longer necessarily achieves the same effect 
as before. Russia may have instilled fear in its 
neighbours and President Vladimir Putin 
acquired additional prestige in the eyes of 
domestic public opinion, but has Moscow 
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Try to imagine a major issue in world politics 
today that could be settled (whether peacefully 
or forcefully) by a single power: one can’t. It’s 
the interplay between at least four poles that 
determines the course of world politics: the 
United States, China, Russia, and, if it wants to, 
the European Union. Thus we are living in a 
multipolar world. These are the great powers 
of the first half of the 21st century: one is the 
established power, one is emerging, one is 
declining, and one is in the making.  
 
Multipolarity is a description of the reality of 
world politics today. It may not be something 
one would wish for, but it cannot be wished 
away, as many analysts and decision-makers 
still do. They should rather be thinking about 
how the great powers will position themselves 
in this multipolar field.  
 
Will the great powers share power and 
cooperate? Or will they try to grab more power 
and seek to dominate?  
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really furthered its interests? Instead of 
restoring former greatness, Russia has lost 
influence in Ukraine, which thanks to the 
invasion is forging a much stronger sense of 
national identity than before. The Russian 
intervention in Syria has safeguarded its 
existing influence, but hardly increased it. The 
crassness of Russian military action has forced 
the western powers to partially abandon 
compartmentalisation and adopt economic 
sanctions. Though perhaps not mainly as a 
result of this, the fact is that economic 
prospects remain bleak. In short, strategically 
Russia is on the defensive.  
 
THE UNITED STATES: TURNING ITS 
BACK ON ITS OWN HISTORY?  
At the end of World War Two, the US created 
the current multilateral system that seeks to 
maintain peace and stability by involving the 
great powers in a cooperative effort. The 
United Nations Security Council epitomises 
this approach, though the US has been less 
willing to share power in the major financial 
and economic multilateral bodies. The US did 
resort to force, at times clearly in support of 
the multilateral order (the 1991 Gulf War to 
liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation), but at 
times in obvious breach of it (the 2003 
invasion of Iraq without cause).  
 
Now US grand strategy is in flux. Every 
American president has put America first – 
but all have considered the preservation of the 
multilateral system that their predecessors 
have created to be necessary to that end. Not 
anymore: as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is 
brutally downsizing the State Department, 
President Donald Trump is disinvesting in 
multilateralism. In his 2017 speech at the UN 
Trump has called for “a great reawakening of 
nations” instead. Like Russia, strategically the 
US has gone onto the defensive. Quoting from 
the same speech: “We can no longer be taken 
advantage of, or enter into a one-sided deal 
where the United States gets nothing in 
return”. In that spirit, the US has withdrawn 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
 is renegotiating the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), leaving its allies 
and partners in the lurch.  
 
Meanwhile one wonders whether the way the 
US tackles ongoing international crises 
contributes to their solution or to their 
escalation. The US didn’t create the North 
Korean crisis or the competition between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran for dominance in the 
Gulf, but Trump’s fiery rhetoric against 
Pyongyang and his encouragement of Riyadh 
are leading to war, not peace. The US is adding 
to instability just as it is weakening the 
multilateral structures that could help mitigate 
it, and without really consulting its allies. 
Rather than sharing power and cooperating, 
the US is reverting to unilateralism, trusting in 
the fact that “Our military will soon be the 
strongest it has ever been”, as Trump said at 
the UN. In that light, it becomes an issue of 
concern how the US will react to China’s 
announcement, at the 19th congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 
2017, that by 2050 it too wants to have a 
“world-class military”.  
 
Of course, grand strategy is a cost-benefit 
calculation – a transactional approach is 
actually nothing new. But Trump gets the 
calculation wrong. Unfortunately he’s not the 
only one. The idea that the US will get more by 
investing less is very powerful politically, and 
will not die therefore with the end of the 
Trump presidency (which, moreover, might 
just last two terms, and then there’s a daughter 
who can run…).  
 
CHINA: A NEW HISTORY?  
At the 19th congress, China wrote one of the 
core projects of its grand strategy into the 
party constitution: the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). This is all about geopolitics: by a 
massive investment in a number of corridors 
of “connectivity” (over land to Europe and the 
Middle East, but also to Pakistan and the 
Indian Ocean, and to South East Asia) China is 
securing its lines of communication with the 
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world and is acquiring substantial influence 
along the way. The BRI, accompanied by new 
institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), is essentially a 
cooperative project, though some on the 
receiving end may think the Chinese approach 
rather too heavy-handed. China reinforces this 
perception by its assertive policies in the East 
and South China Seas. Because it is involved in 
a series of territorial disputes, its neighbours 
are less sanguine about China’s rise, and eye its 
accelerating military modernisation with 
suspicion.  
 
Beijing is still feeling its way into the security 
dimension of its new great power status. A 
policy of non-intervention was easy to declare 
as long as China didn’t have many overseas 
interests anyway. But with Chinese 
investments, and Chinese labour, present 
across the world in ever greater numbers, their 
security has become a concern. The evacuation 
of 35,000 Chinese citizens from the Libyan war 
is a case in point, as is China’s cooperation 
with the EU’s anti-piracy operations off the 
Somali coast. The opening of a naval station in 
Djibouti earlier this year can be seen in this 
light: a power with global interests needs the 
capabilities and the infrastructure to act 
globally.  
 
A great power will also provoke counter-
balancing however, and sometimes outright 
hostility. In 2016 a terrorist attack against the 
Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan wounded three 
local employees. As it is beginning to address 
global security concerns, a China that still 
appears to be uncomfortable in this new role, 
seems to be looking for cooperation, and for a 
multilateral cover for any action it may be 
compelled to take. That is an opportunity to be 
grasped. If on the contrary the fact in itself that 
China aims to develop a “world-class military” 
is seen as a threat, and the other powers are 
unwilling to make some space for China, we 
are set on a collision course.  
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: HISTORY IN 
THE MAKING  
In its 2016 Global Strategy the EU recognized 
the need for diplomatic initiatives to stabilize 
the geopolitically contested regions of the 
world, as well as the importance of mobilizing 
economic instruments to pursue overall 
strategic interests. One of those interests is 
effective multilateral cooperation. The EU 
already has these diplomatic and economic 
instruments, but it should be a lot more 
proactive and creative in putting them to use. 
If optimal use is made of the newly activated 
mechanism of Permanent Structured 
Cooperation, it will be able to complement 
them with a capacity for autonomous military 
action, and thus for security cooperation with 
others.  
 
Starting point of a reinvigorated EU grand 
strategy should be the recognition that the 
alliance with the US is no longer sufficient to 
achieve the EU’s objectives. The EU, 
obviously, needs to maintain it – and try to 
restrain the US. But it also needs to 
complement it, because in this multipolar 
world US and EU priorities and even interests 
coincide much less than before. Hence the EU 
must invest in cooperation with the other 
powers, whenever interests overlap, and try to 
pull them into multilateral cooperation (from 
which the US is withdrawing). In this vein, 
most EU Member States have joined the AIIB, 
and the EU is seeking to connect with the BRI 
(though for the moment in a far too disjointed 
fashion).  
 
An example of what a creative diplomacy could 
achieve, is to make it clear to China that if it 
wants the corridor of the BRI that goes 
overland to Europe and the Middle East to 
succeed, Russia’s power-grab in precisely the 
areas that this “new silk road” has to traverse is 
China’s problem too. China will not be able to 
profit from its investment if Russia keeps 
fomenting war. Vice versa, the EU could signal 
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to a Russia that does not now dare to voice its 
concerns about Chinese encroachment on its 
pretended sphere of influence, that Brussels 
remains willing to involve Moscow in a new 
eastern neighbourhood policy of its own. 
Perhaps after the March 2018 presidential 
elections Russia could afford to offer the 
necessary compromise on Ukraine that would 
make it possible to gradually switch back from 
confrontation to cooperation with the EU.  
 
Could the EU then initiate a trilateral strategic 
dialogue between the three great powers along 
the “new silk road”: Russia, China, and the EU?  
 
CONCLUSION  
Comprehensiveness is the essence of grand 
strategy, which should integrate security, political 
and economic objectives and instruments. 
Current Russian and American strategies are 
doing the opposite. The Russian power grab and 
American disinvestment from multilateralism are 
directly affecting their economic interests, and 
will in term undermine their political and 
security interests too. The smart power of the 
moment is China, which is increasing its reach 
very quickly without alienating its target 
countries. EU strategy would be a lot more 
effective if Member States would put to use the 
instruments that they already have in a united 
and resolute way.  
 
As yet nothing is set in stone. A skilful EU 
strategy of engagement, making use of Russian 
and Chinese sensibilities vis-à-vis each other, 
may yet succeed in returning Russia onto a 
path of cooperation while preventing an all too 
dominant China from emerging. The EU is 
well placed to lead such a strategy – if it gets its 
act together. Though the EU has to maintain a 
critical human rights dialogue, the aim is not to 
change the political system of either Russia or 
China, however authoritarian they may 
become. The aim is to make sure that from a 
world order in flux we move to a new system 
that is based on cooperation and not 
confrontation.  
 
The US would be well-advised to think again 
and reinforce such a cooperative effort rather 
than undermining it. Trump should be careful 
what he wishes for: isolationists might just end 
up being isolated. 
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